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This study explored the relationships between diverse social psychological and 
economic variables and self-reported and officially documented unemployment 
benefit fraud. Two groups receiving unemployment benefit were studied; a fraudu- 
lent group of 45 individuals and a n  honest group of 5 I individuals. Interview meas- 
ures of financial strain, social norms, opportunity for fraud, social controls, personal 
strain, personal orientation, perceived risk of punishment, and intolerance of fraud 
were obtained. The results of univariate and regression analyses revealed that 
although financial strain and social norms did not differ between the two groups, the 
fraudulent group had more opportunity, were less well educated, were more alienated 
and inclined to take risks, and had more positive attitudes toward a variety of kinds 
of fraud. 
Over the past decade social psychologists have become increasingly inter- 
ested in economic behavior and there is now an extensive literature on topics 
such as unemployment (Kelvin & Jarrett, 1985), tax evasion (Friedland, 
1985; Hessing, Elffers, & Weigel, 1988), and saving (Furnham, 1985b; Web- 
ley, Levine, & Lewis, 1991). But surprisingly, given the extensive media 
coverage of social security fraud (Golding & Middleton, 1978, 1982) and 
public interest in the topic, this issue has been almost completely neglected. 
It is crucial at  the outset to put social security fraud in perspective. Despite 
widespread beliefs to the contrary, social security fraud appears to be neither 
extensive nor expensive, though obviously there is considerable variation 
from one country to another and it is hard to  obtain reliable figures. Accord- 
ing to Smith (1986) in Great Britain far more money is saved in unclaimed 
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benefits than is lost in fraud, and from U.S. data it can be estimated that in 
1986 $235 million dollars were fraudulently obtained through unemploy- 
ment benefit compared to $70 billion of income not reported to the tax 
authorities (Kingston, Burgess, & St. Louis, 1981, 1986; Roth, Scholz, & 
Witte, 1989). From the large-scale survey research by Kazemier, van Eck, 
and Koopmans (1990) it appears that benefit fraud is more prevalent in the 
Netherlands than in Britain or America. One survey revealed a 13% partici- 
pation in the black economy overall (with 17% of those receiving benefits 
participating); the other found a 26% participation rate overall (with 28% of 
those receiving benefits participating). These surveys lead to an estimate that 
of the approximately 2 million people receiving benefits in 1986, between 300 
and 600 thousand earned money on the side. The vast majority of these 
earned less than 1,500 guilders ($700) a year from this activity. 
The obvious question then is why d o  some people fraudulently claim 
unemployment benefits? The simplest answer is that the motivation is eco- 
nomic. As one of the social security investigators interviewed by Loveland 
(1989) put it, “I could understand it if there was desperation . . . but with 
these people it is greed not need.” At the heart of Yaniv’s (1986) theoretical 
analysis of fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits there is a n  
assumption that people will defraud the authorities when it pays them to do 
so. If the perceived rewards of fraud outweigh the perceived costs then, given 
the opportunity, individuals will act fraudulently. This economic model has 
failed to account adequately for the similar behavior of evading taxes 
(where, as  Smith and Kinsey (1987) point out, this kind of approach would 
predict that virtually everybody should be evading taxes) and seems unlikely 
to be any more successful in explaining benefit fraud. 
The tax evasion field provides a rich source of social psychological models 
o n  which to base an explanation of benefit fraud (for a review of models, see 
Hessing, Kinsey, Elffers, & Weigel, 1988). Here we propose to use the model 
of Weigel, Hessing, and Elffers (1987), which treats tax evasion as defective 
behavior within a social dilemma. Just as the tax system confronts people 
with a choice between cooperative behavior (paying taxes in full) and defec- 
tive behavior (evading some or all taxes) so does the social security system. 
Here the choice is between cooperating (obeying the rules and if working on 
the side reporting the extra income) or defecting (breaking the rules and 
doing extra paid work without reporting it). Individuals would be better off 
if they broke the rules but the whole system would break down if it was 
abused by all. 
Conceiving a person in receipt of unemployment benefit as being part of a 
social dilemma immediately draws attention to the motivational orientation 
o f  individuals, as this has long been a focus of social dilemma research 
(Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1991). Is a person cooperative, individualistic, 
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or competitive? But individual differences, though an important part of the 
model, are only part of it. The framework (presented in Figure 1) specifies 
two kinds of variables: instigations and constraints. These variables are 
found both in the individual and in the situation with which he or she is 
confronted. For example, social norms that stress wealth as a measure of 
status have their parallel in personal orientations that are self-serving rather 
than altruistic. Instigations operate in the early stage of the process of con- 
templating benefit abuse whereas constraints come into play at a later stage. 
After feeling instigated to do some work on the side (perhaps because of 
financial strain), people then start to think about the constraints and will be 
worried if the constraints are seen as severe or reassured if they are lacking. 
In their more general approach to social dilemmas, Hessing and Elffers 
(1 985) have produced a social-orientation meta-model that specifies the 
situations under which different kinds of variables will predict behavior in a 
social dilemma. The important point in this context is the distinction 
between public and private acts. According to Hessing and Elffers, norms 
will have an influence on behavior only if that behavior is public and visible; 
by contrast central attitudes (e.g., social orientation) will be much more 
relevant with private behavior. The relevance of this to tax evasion and 
benefit fraud is that although evasion and fraud are private acts they are 
often measured publicly (through self-report). This predicts that self- 
reported evasion and fraud may be predicted by rather different variables 
than actual evasion. 
In the tax evasion field this model has performed well. For example, 
Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing ( 1987) measured the self-reported behavior and 
officially documented behavior of two groups of Dutch taxpayers (one 
group of definite evaders, the other group of honest taxpayers) and found a 
neglible correlation between the two measures. Personal constraint measures 
(e.g., fear of punishment, attitudes toward tax evasion) were correlated with 
self-reported behavior but unrelated to documented behavior. Conversely, 
personal instigation measures (e.g., social motivation, alienation) were corre- 
lated with documented behavior but not self-reported behavior. 
The paucity of psychological research into benefit fraud makes it hard to 
judge the model’s value in this field. Two studies however, provide some 
pointers, those of Renooy (1990) and Elffers and Hessing (1990). 
Renooy ( 1990) explored the motives, background, and circumstances that 
lead to participation in the “twilight” economy. He identified structural 
factors which pressured, and opportunity factors which encouraged, people 
to participate in the twilight economy. For a third of his respondents serious 
financial problems were the most important reason for participation. For 
this group their illegal income provided at least 40% of their overall income 
and enabled them to keep their heads above water. A number of opportunity 
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SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
Situational Instigations 
1. Financial main 
(monthly income) 
2. Social Norms 
(perceived incidence of fraud, 
norms for fraudulent behaviour) 
Situational Constraints 
1. opportunity 
(opportunity for fraud in 
occupational group) 
2. Legal conIfols 
3. Social Controls 
(frequency of fraud in 
occupational group) 
ii 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 
Personal instigations 
1. Personal strain 
(comparison of benefit with 
previous earnings. satisfaction 
with household situation) 
2. Personal orientation 
(Competitive social 
orientation, alienation) 
Personal constraints 
1. Perceived opportunity 
2. Perceived risk of punishment 
(ceaainty of being caught. 
severity of punishment) 
3. Intolerance of fraud 
(moral beliefs about fraud) 
1. Officially measured behaviour 
2. Self-reported behaviw 
Figure 1. A social psychological model of unemployment benefit fraud (adapted from 
Weigel, Hessing, & Elffers, 1987). Examples of the variables in the model are included in 
brackets. 
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factors were also important. Participation in the twilight economy was asso- 
ciated with appropriate skills, better education, supportive cultural stand- 
ards, and positive attitudes toward participation. 
Although the sample size is small (and includes many who are not engag- 
ing in fraud), this certainly suggests that the Weigel et al. (1987) model is 
plausible, though it is predictable that respondents should mention financial 
strain. 
The results of the Elffers and Hessing (1990) study are less self-evident. 
They put questions on benefit fraud and evasion to a large tele-interview 
panel, which consists of people who in return for a PC are required to 
answer each week a series of questions on a variety on topics presented to 
them on the micro-computer. Three of the questions concerned whether the 
respondent had done any moonlighting over the past year, whether they had 
evaded taxes, and whether they had done work on the side while receiving 
unemployment benefit. These questions were put on different occasions. 
What was striking was that all these behaviors correlated significantly; there 
was a particularly high correlation between benefit fraud and moonlighting 
(.42). These behaviors also correlated with competitiveness. This suggests 
that those individuals who fraudulently claim unemployment benefit are not 
so much unemployed who have strayed, rather that they are habitually make 
use of whatever opportunity arises. If they are receiving unemployment 
benefit then that is working on the side, if they have a proper job it is 
moonlighting and tax evasion. 
These results certainly provide some support for the Weigel et al. (1987) 
model (in that personal orientation is implicated). To go further requires a 
full-scale study as reported below. This sets out to explore the relationships 
between diverse social psychological and economic variables and self- 
reported and officially documented benefit fraud. Based on the tax evasion 
research we predict that personal constraint measures will predict self- 
reported fraud but be unrelated to documented fraud. Conversely, personal 
instigation measures will be correlated with documented fraud but not self- 
reported fraud. As in the Elffers et al. (1987) study a contrast design was 
employed with one group that were officially classified as having fraudu- 
lently claimed benefit and the other group being officially classified as 
honest. 
Method 
Background: The Dutch Unemployment Benefit System 
People employed in the private sector, as well as their employers, pay a 
percentage of their earnings as unemployment allowance premium. If they 
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lose their jobs (through no fault of their own) they may claim unemployment 
benefit for up to a year. They must actively look for work and report once a 
week on their progress. If they earn anything during this period this must be 
reported to the agency so that their benefit may be lowered proportionately 
(for more details see Social Security News, 1987). 
Our concern is with individual benefit fraud, which occurs when an 
employee has a paid job and still claims benefit. If this is detected, the 
fraudulent claimant will be given a bill for the amount overpaid and will lose 
his benefit. If the defrauded amount is greater than a certain threshold, the 
claimant will face criminal proceedings. 
Subjects and Procedure 
The contrast groups (fraudulent, honest) were set up by the regional of- 
fices of the Federatie van Bedrijfsverenigingen (Federation of Industrial 
Insurance Boards). The fraudulent group were compiled from the files of the 
ag,ency’s Fraud Investigation Division. They were asked to look for cases 
which met the following description: 
People who have incorrectly claimed an unemployment benefit. 
The investigator must have no doubt about the intention to 
defraud. It should have occurred in 1985, 1986, or 1987, concern 
an amount of at least flOOO (approximately $500) fraudulently 
obtained benefit money and have been sent to the public 
prosecutor. 
The honest group was drawn from the general files of the agency and 
consisted of people who had drawn an unemployment benefit in 1985, 1986, 
and 1987 and about whom there was no reason to be suspicious. 
To protect the privacy of the respondents a procedure similar to that used 
by Elffers et al. (1987) was employed. Briefly, this involved the use of an 
independent third party, to ensure that at no time did the agency, the third 
party or the researchers have all the information about an individual (name 
and address, official data, interview data). The agency only ever knew the 
name, address, and official data and the researchers obtained, finally, the 
official data coupled with the interview data but without names and 
addresses (for more details of this procedure see Robben, Elffers, & Verlind, 
1989). 
The agency was able to select 376 cases in the honest group and 343 in the 
fraudulent group. These people were then asked, through a series of letters 
from the university, if they would take part in an interview study of opinions 
about tax and social security. This series of letters were constructed follow- 
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ing Dillman’s Total Design Method (1978) because of worries that the 
response rate might be low. Thus everyone received the first two letters, an  
initial letter that stressed the importance of people participating in order t o  
obtain a n  accurate picture followed by a reminder a week later. Those who 
had not replied received after a week another letter and, after a n  interval of a 
further 2 weeks, those who had still not replied received a registered letter. 
Despite this the response was poor. Overall 26% agreed to  participate (106 in 
the honest group, 76 in the fraud group), 40% never responded, 18% had 
moved or died, and 1 1 %  refused (most of these after the fourth mailing). Of 
these 96 people were interviewed, 51 in the honest group (34 men, 14 women) 
and 45 in the fraudulent group (42 men, 3 women). 
Using data supplied by the agency it was possible to  compare the respon- 
dents with the nonrespondents on certain characteristics. There were no 
significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents or between 
the honest and fraudulent group for salary per month, number of hours 
worked and benefit per month. More importantly for the fraudulent group 
there were no significant differences between the respondents and nonre- 
spondents for duration of fraud, estimated total amount of fraud, whether 
the person concerned was a first offender, sanctions applied in the past, and 
the agency’s estimate of the frequency of fraud in the occupational group. 
Dependent Measures 
The dependent measures were of two kinds. The vast majority were 
derived from interviews which were carried out in the respondent’s own 
homes by research assistants and which lasted, on average, 2 hours. The 
interviews were very highly structured and essentially consisted of taking the 
respondents through a long questionnaire ensuring that no questions were 
omitted. The remaining measures were derived from the unemployment 
agency. The dependent measures are described here according to their place 
in the model; this was not the order followed in the interview. The descrip- 
tion given here is necessarily succinct; full details of the dependent measures 
can be found in Hessing, Elffers, Robben, and Webley (1991). 
Situational Instigations 
Financial strain. The interview asked for net income prior t o  receiving 
unemployment benefit, amount of unemployment benefit, and a self-classifi- 
cation of income group. 
Social norms. Social Norms were assessed in three ways (a) using meas- 
ures of disapproval of unemployment in the neighborhood (b) measuring 
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the estimated incidence of benefit fraud (c) using questions that explored the 
attitudes of others to benefit fraud. 
Situational Constraints 
Opportunity. Twenty one unemployment agency officials were given a list 
of 91 occupations and asked to estimate how easy it was to earn money on 
the side in each occupation. Their mean estimates were used as the measure 
of opportunity. 
Social controls. Frequency of fraud in the occupational group of each 
respondent was estimated by officials in the unemployment agency. 
Personal Instigations 
Personal strain. Respondents gave a comparison of unemployment benefit 
with previous income and with the minimum wage in Holland and indicated 
their satisfaction with their household economic situation (a scale with an 
alpha of .79), their view of the perceived level of benefit (a scale with an 
alpha of .75), and their view of the perceived fairness of social security rules 
(a scale with an alpha of .73). 
Personal orientation. A large number of measures of personal orientation 
were used, most of which were well established scales. Social orientation was 
measured using the decomposed games method employed by Liebrand 
(1982) and McClintock and Allison (1989). Based on their choices people 
were classified as altruistic (score l), cooperative (score 2), individualistic (3), 
or competitive (4). Free-rider behavior was assessed using items concerned 
with behavior such as blood donation and energy saving taken from Condie, 
Warner, and Gillman (1976). Risk-taking was measured using the relevant 
scale (alpha = .72) from the Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson, 1976). 
Alienation was measured using the scales of Zeller, Neal, and Groat (1980). 
Disinhibition was assessed using Hauber, Toornvliet, and Willemse’s (1986) 
scale (alpha = .76) which is based on Zuckerman’s (1979) sensation-seeking 
scale. The Protestant Work Ethic was assessed with 11 items taken from 
Mirels and Garett (1971). Single measures of the perceived exchange rela- 
tionship with government and horizontal equity were also used. 
Personal Constraints 
Perceived opportunity. Perceived opportunity of fraud was measured 
Perceived risk ofpunishment. Respondents were presented with hypothet- 
using a single item. 
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ical situations involving fraud and asked to estimate the likelihood of being 
caught and the likely severity of punishment if caught. 
Intolerance of fraud. Attitudes toward unemployment benefit fraud and 
attitudes toward social security fraud were both measured in the same way 
using five semantic differentials. Attitude toward tax and benefit fraud was 
measured using a 10-item Likert scale with an alpha of .79. Attitude toward 
abuse of the social security system was a 4-item scale based on that on 
Furnham (1985a). 
Other Variables 
Demographics. Respondents were asked for information about sex, age, 
occupation, and educational level. 
Self-reported fraud. Toward the end of the interview respondents were 
asked ‘‘In the past two years have you earned money on the side when 
receiving unemployment benefit?” 
Other. Respondents were asked about their experience of unemployment. 
The imaginability of oneself evading taxes was measured using a variant of 
Newman’s (1976) scale of crime seriousness. Respondents had to rank order 
I0 illegal acts according to their seriousness, and then indicate the most 
serious crime they could imagine committing. In addition there were some 
questions about their knowledge of the social security system and a number 
of other questions (e.g., concerning their intention to work on the side) 
which are not reported here. Full details can be found in Robben et al. 
( 1989). 
Results 
The results consist of three parts. First, we provide some information on 
the correspondence of self-reported and official fraud. The next section is a 
simple univariate comparison between the honest and fraudulent individuals 
as defined by the authorities and as defined by themselves. Finally, we 
present regression analyses to identify the best predictors of (a) fraud accord- 
ing to the authorities and (b) self-reported fraud. Though multivariate struc- 
tural analysis would, in principle, provide a better test of our model we have 
not used this form of analysis as the number of cases is modest compared 
with the number of relationships that should be estimated. This makes this 
form of analysis vulnerable to stray findings. In this way we try to avoid the 
pitfall of overinterpreting associations that may not survive an analysis with 
more observations. 
Table 1 compares self-reported fraud with officially defined fraud. It is 
clear that the majority of the respondents reported their fraud status accu- 
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Table 1 
Seelf-Reported Misuse of the Allowance Compared with the View 
of the Unemployment Agency 
Fraud status according 
to the agency 
no fraud fraud 
total Self-report 
Denied having received an allowance 8 8 16 
[no fraud] 16% 18% 17% 
Had no additional income 
[no fraud] 
Reported additional income 
[no fraud] 
29 7 36 
57% 16% 38% 
9 4 13 
18% 9% 14% 
Did not report additional income 5 26 31 
[fraud] 10% 58% 30% 
Total 51 45 96 
Note. Percentages are with respect to column totals. 
Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficients, after dichomizing the self-report into 
fraud/no fraud are 0.51 (total table) and 0.60 (omitting first row). 
rately, though five of the supposedly honest group had earned money on the 
side (and not been detected) and 11 of the fraudulent group claimed never to 
have committed fraud. Even more striking is that 16 respondents claimed 
not to have had any unemployment benefit. 
Given that there is a good correspondence between the official view and 
the view of the respondents themselves, it is unsurprising that simple univari- 
ate comparisons between the honest and fraudulent groups give very similar 
results whether membership of these groups is defined by the authorities or 
by self-reports. Table 2 presents the means for the various measures. It is 
evident that lower income does not lead to fraud; though the differences are 
not significant, the honest group has a lower unemployment benefit and had 
lower income previously. However, income per se is probably a poor opera- 
tionalization of financial strain and possibly the greater drop in income of 
the fraudulent group would result in more financial difficulties. It is interest- 
ing, in this context, that the fraudulent group do make a more unfavorable 
comparison between their current benefit and their previous earnings than 
the honest group. 
There is no evidence that social norms are encouraging fraud (though the 
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differences between the two groups are all in the expected direction). On the 
other hand, according to  the officials in the agency, the occupations of those 
in the fraudulent group d o  provide a greater opportunity for fraud. Only 
some of the measures of personal orientation differentiate the two groups: 
The most intriguing finding is that the fraudulent group have a higher score 
on the Protestant Work Ethic scale. The measures of personal constraint 
reveal several differences. Fraudsters have a more tolerant attitude toward 
all kinds of fraud and estimate the chances of being caught (and the severity 
of punishment) as higher, presumably the result of their having been caught 
and punished. 
The univariate comparisons give an idea of how the fraudulent and honest 
groups differ, but are not a good way of testing the theoretical model pre- 
sented above. Ideally, one would like to  fit a linear structural model, but the 
number of cases is small in comparison with the number of variables and so 
the power of a fitting technique would be unacceptably low. To give some 
idea of how well the variables can be used to predict fraud two regression 
analyses were carried out, using variables from Table 1 as independent meas- 
ures and official and self-reported fraud status as the dependent measures. 
Table 3 presents the results of these analyses. Four variables are able to 
explain 45% of the variance in officially defined fraud, namely, the frequency 
of fraud in occupational group, perceived chance of being caught, attitude 
toward unemployment benefit fraud, and the imaginability of oneself evad- 
ing taxes. Less of the variance of self-reported fraud can be explained (3 1%) 
and with a different set of four variables (the frequency of fraud in the 
occupational group again, disinhibition, perceived fairness of social security 
rules and attitude toward abuse of the social security system. 
Discussion 
These results are clearly limited by the comparatively small scale of the 
investigation, the relatively poor response rate, and the fact that our classifi- 
cation of individuals as fraudulent or honest is not watertight. Some fraudu- 
lent individuals are found in the “honest” group, and it is possible that the 
official records have erroneously categorized people as committing fraud. 
Nonetheless, we can be sure that the fraud group are more fraudulent than 
the honest group and the fact that there are no significant differences 
between respondents and nonrespondents in the fraud group on a number of 
indices make us confident that this sample is representative. 
Our initial hypothesis was that personal constraint measures would pre- 
dict self-reported fraud but be unrelated to documented fraud and that 
personal instigation measures would be correlated with documented fraud 
but not self-reported fraud. This is clearly not the case; both types of vari- 
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Table 3 
Variables Predicting Fraud 
(a) With officially defined fraud as the 
dependent variable 
Frequency of fraud in occupational group 
[social control] 
Attitudes toward unemployment benefit 
fraud 
[intolerance of fraud] 
Estimated likelihood of being caught 
[risk of punishment] 
Imaginability of self evading taxes 
(b) With self-reported fraud as the 
dependent variable 
Perceived fairness of social security rules 
[personal strain] 
Disinhibition 
[personal orientation] 
Frequency of fraud in occupational group 
[social control] 
Attitude toward abuse of the social 
security system 
[intolerance of fraud] 
.46 .21 .31 .OW .46 
.55 .30 .30 .001 .39 
.64 .41 -.34 .001 -.37 
.67 .45 .20 .016 .33 
.38 .15 -.28 .OOO -.38 
.48 .23 .27 .002 .34 
.52 .27 .34 .031 .31 
.56 .31 -.23 .029 -.19 
Note. R = Multiple correlation coefficient. R2 = Squared multiple correlation 
coefficient (explained variance). fi = Standardized regression coefficient. (Y = 
Significance level. r = Pearson correlation coefficient with dependent measure. 
ables predict both types of fraud. Here the correspondence between official 
amd self-reported behavior is much higher than in comparable studies of 
illegal behavior (cf. Hessing et al., 1987). This is probably because the behav- 
ior (working while receiving benefit) is much clearer for both the authorities 
and the individual than a more diffuse behavior like tax evasion, where 
questions of intent a re  important and  the behavior is probably defined dif- 
ferently by the authorities and individuals. 
The picture of those who fraudulently claim unemployment benefit con- 
firms and extends the results of Renooy (1990) and  Elffers and Hessing 
(1990) and provides some support for the model of Weigel et al. (1987). The 
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kinds of variables that their model highlights certainly seem to be important, 
though it has to be admitted that social instigations seem to play a weak role. 
For officially measured behavior situational and personal constraints are the 
best predictors; for self-reported behavior, personal instigations are also 
important. Perhaps equally significant are the variables that fail to differen- 
tiate the two groups, most notably competitive social orientation. On the 
other hand, the results suggest that social security fraud in Holland may 
have a distinctively Dutch flavor. Though the evidence is very poor (essen- 
tially occasional references in case studies) Kelvin and Jarrett (1985) claim 
that informal economic activity by the unemployed in Britain is not internal- 
ized; it may help financially but it has an ephemeral quality with less salience 
than a real job. Our research, and that of Renooy (1990), implies that, for 
some Dutch people at least, working on the side is a way of life. 
From the authorities’ point of view the applied relevance of this research is 
what it tells us about preventing or limiting fraud. As far as personal orienta- 
tion is concerned, there seems little room for maneuver. Personal orientation 
is relatively stable and not easily changed. However although from the perspec- 
tive of fraud prevention the personal orientations of the fraudsters may be 
worrying, from the perspective of unemployment prevention the higher work 
ethic of the fraudsters is encouraging. With changes in the social security 
system, that allow those on unemployment benefit to work these people would 
be an asset. Attitudes look like a better prospect for change but we have our 
doubts. It seems likely, on the basis of previous research, that people bring 
their attitudes in line with their behavior and so the positive attitudes of the 
fraudsters toward fraud may merely reflect the fact that they are, after all, 
fraudsters. Punishment is the traditional way of dealing with crime, but here, 
a t  least, it seems to have little deterrent effect. A more draconian system, with 
better detection and heavier punishment may deter people from benefit fraud 
but one suspects that using legal means to hit at those at  the bottom of the 
social pile may be socially unacceptable. Finally we come to opportunity. Just 
as in tax evasion research, opportunity is a crucial variable. But on the face on 
it there seems little the authorities can do about this. 
We believe that we have shown that it is both possible and fruitful, 
through a combination of official data with self-report data, to go some way 
to understanding the determinants of unemployment benefit fraud. This 
research is only a beginning and has some obvious limitations. But it pro- 
vides a firm basis for future research. 
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